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COMMENTARIES

RICO and the Rule of Lenity
ELLSWORTH

I.

A.

VAN GRAAFEILAND*

INTRODUCTION

When Congress enacted RICO in 1970,1 it provided that the Act
was to "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." ' 2
Speaking only as a lawyer and not as a judge, I suggest that this
clause cannot be applied constitutionally to RICO's criminal provisions.

One of the basic tenets of statutory construction is that a criminal
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act must be
couched in language sufficiently clear that "men of common intelligence" can understand what it means. 3 Despite numerous judicial
pronouncements to the contrary, I do not believe that RICO satisfies
this requirement. In so stating, I do not mean to suggest that RICO
should have been declared unconstitutional on its face. I do maintain

that, as RICO is applied in individual cases, its ambiguity is sufficiently pernicious to call into play the doctrine of strict construction.4
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 196168 (1982).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
(84 Stat. 947) 4007, 4036.
3. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (construing several
sections of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926)) (striking down a New Jersey statute which sought to label and imprison
"gangsters"); United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying
sections of the Securities Exchange Act to a corporate officer who failed to disclose
on a proxy statement that he was guilty of uncharged crimes).
4. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (considering
vagueness of 18 U.S.C. § 1715, which prohibits mailing of weapons capable of
being concealed on the person); Redford v. United States, 691 F.2d 471, 473 (10th
Cir. 1982) (considering ambiguity of statute prohibiting the mentally incompetent
from owning firearms).
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AMBIGUITIES

"ENTERPRISE"

During the first decade of RICO's existence, a minority group of
federal judges, all of whom certainly qualified as "men of common
intelligence," ' decided, after more careful review than the ordinary
man of common intelligence would conduct, that the term "enterprise' 6
as used in RICO applied only to legitimate businesses or organizations.
Circuit Judge Bownes' well-reasoned opinion in United States v.
Turkette7 demonstrates that the position of this small group of judges
was not lacking in logical support. However, the Supreme Court, in
reversing Turkette, held that the term "enterprise" included both
legal and illegal groups." Justice White, who wrote for the Court,
stated without equivocation that there was "no ambiguity in the
RICO provisions at issue." 9
5. The judges in question included Chief Judge Coffin and Circuit Judge
Bownes of the First Circuit, and District Judge Boyle, sitting by designation in the
First Circuit, see United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding
RICO "enterprise" not applicable to conduct of wholly criminal enterprise), rev'd,
452 U.S. 576 (1981); Judge Van Graafeiland of the Second Circuit, see United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107-11 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting) (strictly construing "enterprise" and construing statute in favor of
lenity), cert. denied sub nom, Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Judges
Merritt, Keith, and Engel of the Sixth Circuit, see United States v. Sutton, 605
F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (held "enterprise" describes a unit of organization
established to perform undertaking or project, as opposed to the undertaking or
project itself, and involves something more than an individual or group engaged in
a pattern of racketeering activity), vacated in pertinent part, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Merritt, Keith, Martin and Jones, JJ., dissenting) (finding no
ambiguity in term "enterprise"), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Judges Gibson,
Heaney and Stephenson of the Eighth Circuit, see United States v. Anderson, 626
F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding "enterprise" encompasses only an association
having an ascertainable structure which exists for purposes of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has existence that can be defined apart
from "pattern of racketeering"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); District Judge
Newman, see United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58-61 (D. Conn. 1975)
(favoring narrow construction of "enterprise").

6. "Enterprise," as defined in § 1961(4), "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4)
(1982).
7. 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980).
8. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
9. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 n.10. Since Justice Stewart stated in dissent
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When I act in my judicial capacity, I have no alternative except
to follow the path outlined by the Supreme Court and earlier decisions
of my own court. However, ruminating in a lay capacity as I am
now, I must confess that I have some problems with this facile
conclusion of "no ambiguity." As subsequent events have demonstrated, the term "enterprise" is not unambiguous. For example, there
has been a substantial dispute among the circuits as to whether a
RICO enterprise must exist separate from the pattern of racketeering
activity in which the enterprise engages. 10 Closely allied thereto is the
question whether the enterprise must be an entity separate from the
"person" who engages in the pattern of racketeering activity, and
whether sections 1962(a)" and 1962(c)12 should be treated in the same
that he agreed with Judge Bownes' interpretation of the term "enterprise," id. at
593, he apparently would agree that, at the very least, the term was ambiguous.
There is a marked contrast between the Supreme Court's decision in Turkette and
its earlier decision in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). In Turkette,
the word at issue was "enterprise," which the Court said could be either legal or
illegal. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581-82. In Lanzetta, the word at issue was "gang,"
which the Court said also could be either legal or illegal. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at
457. In holding the statute in Lanzetta to be sufficiently vague and uncertain that
it violated due process, the Court said that it would be difficult to hold, in advance
of judicial utterance on the subject, that the defendants were bound to understand
the challenged provision. Id. at 456.
10. See United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 362-64 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("enterprise" is not equivalent to pattern of racketeering), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
65 (1988); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 87-90 (2d Cir. 1983) ("enterprise"
and "pattern of racketeering" must both be shown, but proof of the two need not
be distinct and independent), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); Gerace v. Utica
Veal Co., 580 F. Supp. 1465, 1468-69 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("enterprise" need not be
separate and distinct from "pattern of racketeering").
11. § 1962. Prohibited activities:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States
Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or
the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the
intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if
the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
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manner with respect to this issue.13 The Second Circuit has been
confronted with the issue of how "continuing in nature" an entity or
group must be to qualify as an enterprise under RICO.' 4 The Second
Circuit's emphasis on enterprise continuity, however, is not typical of
that of most other circuits. 5 In a long line of cases, courts wrestled
with the question whether legislative, judicial, and executive offices
of government were enterprises under RICO.' 6 Unfortunately, in allor any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to
elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
12. (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
13. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union
639, 839 F.2d 782, 788-92 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("person" and "enterprise" must be
distinct entities), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 309 (1988); Schofield v. First Commodity
Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-32 (1st Cir. 1986) ("person" and "enterprise" must be
distinct entities); Bennett v. United States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308,
314-15 (2d Cir. 1985) (complaint deficient where it cast defendant as both "enterprise" and "person"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
14. See Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988) (complaint failed
"continuity" requirement of civil RICO action in connection with conversion of
apartment building to condominiums), vacated en banc, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.
1989); Creative Bath Products, Inc. v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 837 F.2d
561 (2d Cir. 1988) (no pattern where insurance agent made three fraudulent
representations pursuant to a short-lived goal); Albany Ins. Co. v. Esses, 831 F.2d
41 (2d Cir. 1987) (insured's fraudulent representations of value and loss of goods
was insufficient for RICO "pattern" where there was no continuing threat beyond
goal of fraudulently gaining proceeds); Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898 (2d Cir.
1987); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987)
(alleged fraudulent sale of goods, with short-term goal of one-time sale, insufficient
to satisfy "enterprise"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988); United States v.
Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986) (RICO "continuity" satisfied when person
commits two acts with common purpose of furthering continuing illegal enterprise),
cert. denied, Cohen v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 3229 (1987).
15. See Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadbws Urban Renewal Corp., 829
F.2d 1263, 1267 (3d Cir. 1987) (focusing on "pattern"). But see Manax v. Mc
Namara, 842 F.2d 808, 811-12 (5th Cir. 1988) (short-term goal of destroying
plaintiff's medical practice not sufficiently "continuous"). After en banc review,
the Second Circuit shifted the emphasis of continuity from the enterprise to the
pattern element in United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381-84 (2d Cir.
1989). Nevertheless, the nature of the enterprise may still be used to show the
continuity sufficient to establish a pattern. Id.
16. United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Office of
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too-many instances, the defendant involved did not learn of the
generally affirmative answer to this question until after he had been

convicted. Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to note that the late

Judge Friendly, who was acknowledged widely to have one of the

finest legal minds in the country, said, in departing from the general
view, "[n]o one would think of describing a court as an 'enterprise'
17
as a matter of ordinary English speech.'
B.

"PATTERN OF RACKETEERING"

The ambiguity surrounding the RICO phrase "pattern of rack-

eteering activity" (hereafter "pattern") is as great as that which
surrounds the word "enterprise."

The definition contained in the

statute states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering

activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter
and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period

of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering

activity."'" However, the courts have used this "definition" simply
as a starting point, and then have drifted in different directions. In
the much-cited footnote fourteen of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' 9

the Court stated that proof of two acts of racketeering activity,
without more, does not establish a pattern and that what was required

' 20
was proof of "continuity plus relationship.
In Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. ,21 Judge Phillips, writing for

the Fourth Circuit, said that "[s]ince Sedima, the lower courts have
struggled to give content to the vague notions of 'continuity' and
'relationship' that are now considered the distinctive characteristics

Governor" can, but should not, be used as enterprise in a RICO indictment for
reasons of comity), cert. denied, Sisk v. United States, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982);
United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30-35 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding government
units, such as New York City Civil Court are "enterprises" within meaning of
RICO), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d
682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979) (city police department and officers are "enterprises"
within meaning of RICO), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980). Although these cases
are part of a now unanimous rule, each was accompanied by a dissenting opinion.
17. United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 42 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.,
concurring in result).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
19. 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
20. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (quoting
Senate Report on RICO).
21. 847 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1988).
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of the RICO 'pattern."' 22 Citing Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan,"
Judge Phillips continued:

this task has not been an easy one, for the terms 'relationship'
and 'continuity,' as used in Sedima, are inherently contradic-

tory. 'Relationship' implies that the predicate acts were com-

mitted close together in time, involve the same victim or type
of misconduct, or both; 'continuity' implies more extended
periods of time almost inevitably involving different victims.
An excessive focus on either factor in a given fact situation
24
may effectively eliminate the other.

To constitute a pattern in the Second Circuit, there need not be
multiple ventures or plans. 25 The racketeering acts in connection
With a single unlawful plan will satisfy the statute so long as they
are part of a continuing enterprise. 26 To the extent the Second Circuit
finds it unnecessary to show more than one fraudulent scheme to
establish a pattern, several other circuits appear to agree.2 7 Others
disagree.28 Because the Second Circuit's interpretation of "pattern"
is, in the words of Judge Oakes, "at least as confusing as the

22. Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 847 F.2d 1100, 1103 (4th Cir. 1988).
23. 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (alleged mail fraud by defendant bank
consisted of several acts over a period of years, thus satisfying "continuing" and
"pattern" requirements of RICO).
24. Walk, 847 F.2d at 1103 (citing Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d
970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986)).
25. United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 2035 (1988).
26. Id.

27. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d
Cir. 1987) (one continuing scheme with two or more acts is sufficient); Sun Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987) (single, ongoing
kickback scheme sufficient); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928-29
(10th Cir. 1987) (single, ongoing scheme is sufficient for RICO, but if scheme is to
achieve single discrete objective, it is not sufficiently "continuing"); Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1986); Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (l1th Cir. 1986)
(acts that are part of same scheme qualify as "pattern"). But see Schreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serve-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (one scheme
without threat of continuing activity, is insufficient).
28. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir.
1987) (single fraudulent scheme is insufficient). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in H.J. Inc. on March 21, 1988, 108 S.Ct. 1219 (1988), and the appeal was
argued on November 8, 1988.
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divergent paths taken by the other federal courts," 29 the Court
decided that the problem merited en banc consideration.3 0
C.

"SEPARATE DISTINCT RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE INJURY"

For several years, the various circuits struggled to decide whether
the plaintiff in a civil RICO action must allege a separate distinct
racketeering enterprise injury." One Second Circuit panel held that
under the "plain meaning" of section 1964(c) such an allegation was
required. 2 Another panel held that the statutory language was
"clear[ly]" to the contrary.33 The Supreme Court settled the argument by holding that there was no requirement of a racketeering
injury separate from that which resulted from the predicate act,3 4
and, in the process, once again rejected the contention that ambiguity
existed. 35 However, in view of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion,
which was concurred in by Justices Brennan, Blackmun; and Powell,
who also filed a separate dissenting opinion, one must gulp a little
in accepting the argument that it was not statutory ambiguity that
divided the Court. When a statute can be construed in two different
ways by reasonably well-informed persons, the statute properly may
be termed ambiguous. 3 6 Grammatical purists might argue that it is
statutory vagueness rather than ambiguity that has resulted in the
divisions among judges. However, ambiguity, defined as "doubleness of meaning, ' 3 7 describes more accurately the interpretational
difficulties which have characterized RICO litigation. Whatever the
29. Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1988). This was not
the first time that Judge Oakes criticized the ambiguity of RICO. In his opinion in
Sedima, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, he said "RICO, then, presents
a classic case of a statute whose ambiguous language needs to be construed in light
of Congress's [sic] purpose in enacting it." Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (footnote omitted).
30. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989); Beauford
v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988).
31. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494 n.14.
32. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1984) (must
allege a proprietary injury caused by a RICO violation, not just one caused by
some elements of RICO violation).
33. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom.
Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S. 922 (1985).

34. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495.
35. Id. at 499.

36. See, Evangelical Alliance Mission v. Village of Williams Bay, 54 Wis. 2d

187, 189-90, 194 N.W.2d 646, 648 (1972); H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON
TION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 27 at 55 (2d ed. 1911).
37. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 73 (5th ed. 1979).

THE CONSTRUC-
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cause, the result is lack of clarity. "In the framework of criminal
prosecution, unclarity alone is enough to resolve the doubts in favor
of defendants." 38
D.

"INTEREST"

On the question whether statutory ambiguity exists, it is also
instructive to trace the judicial history of Russello v. United States39
which deals with the meaning of the word "interest" as used in 18
U.S.C. sections 1962 and 1963(a)(1). At issue was the question
whether insurance proceeds obtained through the conduct of an
arson ring constituted "interest" under the statute. The trial court
ruled in the government's favor, but was reversed by a panel of the
Fifth Circuit.40 On en banc review, the panel in turn was affirmed
on this issue with seven judges dissenting. 41 The Supreme Court,
categorizing the litigation as "yet another case concerning [RICO] ,"42
and the issue as the "interpretation of the chapter's forfeiture
provision, § 1963(a)(1), and, specifically, the meaning of the words
'any interest [the defendant] has acquired ... in violation of section
1962,' 43 concluded that "the language of the RICO forfeiture provision is clear,"" and that the "language of the statute plainly covers
the insurance proceeds.... ,"45 Once again, one can only wonder
why the Fifth Circuit panel and the six dissenting en banc judges
could have so egregiously misinterpreted the statutory language that
tl~e Supreme Court found to be "clear" and "plain[]."

II.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

CLARITY

Challenges to RICO usually are countered with the argument
that RICO was enacted to combat the prevalent evil of organized
crime. However, the concept of a war against crime cannot be used
38. United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 441 (1960).
39. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
40. 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc), aff'd sub nom., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
41. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd
sub nom., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
42. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 17 (1983).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 29.
45. Id. at 22.
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to justify legislation that "would otherwise fail to meet constitutional
standards of definiteness and clarity."
"The most odious of all
oppressions are those which mask as justice." ' 47 There is no such
thing as a federal common law crime, and judges are not permitted

to create federal offenses by decision."8 The statute which creates an
offense must be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties .... ,,49 "When a person of ordinary intelligence has not

received fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden,

prosecution for such conduct deprives him of due process." 5 0 Judicial
enlargement of an ambiguous statute, particularly when made contemporaneously with the trial of one accused thereunder, "is at war
with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be

defined with appropriate definiteness."'" The Supreme Court has
46. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (California statute required
persons who were found loitering or wandering the streets to provide "credible and
reliable" identification when requested by police. The Supreme Court found it

unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the due process clause).
47. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 458 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
48. See United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 210 (1963) (defendant was
charged with selling fruits and vegetables in two quart metal hampers in violation
of federal statute. The trial court dismissed and the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal on the grounds that the statute specifications only applied to four quart
containers); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 240 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(defendants's conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits
was found to be a "crime involving moral turpitude" within the meaning of §
19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917"), reh'g denied, 341 U.S. 956 (1951); Viereck
v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943) (defendant was convicted of violating a
federal act which required the registration of agents of foreign principals, where
defendant only disclosed those activities done for the foreign principal and did not
disclose those done on his own behalf. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the
Act only explicitly required disclosure of activities done for foreign principals);
Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926) (plan for obtaining money, by
means of intimidation through threats of murder and bodily harm was not a
"scheme to defraud" within the purpose of executing any "scheme or artifice to
defraud").
49. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (quoting Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) (New Jersey statute defining certain
persons as "gangsters" held to be in violation of due process clause because of its
vagueness and uncertainty).
50. United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendant,
corporate officer, was found not to have violated section of the Securities Exchange
Act when he failed to disclose on proxy statement that he was guilty of uncharged
bribery and tax evasion conspiracy).
51. Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941) (the defendant's fraud-
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expressed its belief that "those affected by a statute are entitled to
be free of the burdens of defending prosecutions, however expeditious, aimed at hammering out the structure of the statute piecemeal,
5' 2
with no likelihood of obviating similar uncertainty for others."
B.

LENITY

An inevitable offshoot of the requirement of statutory clarity is
the doctrine of lenity.
[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what
conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before
we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.
We should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambigu53
ous implication.
Moreover, because of RICO's harsh penalties, including that of
forfeiture, we must not forget that the doctrine of lenity "applies
not only to the interpretation of the substantive ambit of criminal
prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose." '5 4 Three reasons
ulent impersonation of an officer or employee of a corporation owned or controlled
by the United States was not an offense under § 32 of the Criminal Code, prior to
its amendment by the Act of February 28, 1938).
52. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965). See also Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974) (defendant could not be properly charged under
state flag misuse statute when the statute imposes criminal liability upon one who
"publicly ... treats contemptuously the flag of the United States" and defendant
wore a small United States flag on the seat of his pants because language of "treats
contemptuously" was too vague); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353
(1964) (it is violation of defendant's due process rights to give retroactive application
of a new construction of an existing state statute because defendants did not receive
fair warning of a criminal prohibition).
53. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22
(1952) (in an action under § 15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, § 15 is not to be
read as enabling the prosecutor to treat as a separate offense, each breach of the
statutory duty owed to a single employee during any work week). See also McNally
v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987) (mail fraud statute does not prohibit
schemes to defraud the people of their intangible rights to honest and impartial
government); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1958) (it was error
for the district court to find defendant guilty on two counts of assault when
defendant fired one shotgun blast that resulted in injury to two persons).
54. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (section 406 of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 does not authorize
the imposition of a special parole term even though that sanction is included within
the penalty provision of the target offense). See also Simpson v. United States, 435
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are customarily advanced for applying the rule of lenity. One of

them is the salutary belief that "because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures
and not courts should define criminal activity," 5 5 Where the legis-

the belief simply
lature in question is the United States 5Congress,
6
expresses what the Constitution dictates.
A second reason courts apply the rule of lenity, one that is

being recognized as increasingly important, is that clarity and definiteness in statutory language preclude arbitrary and selective pros-

ecution based on the personal predilections of law enforcement
officers and prosecutors.57

The third, and by far the most important reason, is the due
process requirement of notice. The rule is "rooted in fundamental

principles of due process which mandate that no individual be forced

to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited.""
The fifth and fourteenth amendments provide that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. In Dunn v. United States19 the Supreme Court made clear that
its "long-established practice of resolving questions concerning the
ambit of a criminal statute in favor of lenity" was "not merely a

U.S. 6, 14-15 (1978) (in a prosecution for a single bank robbery with firearms, the
defendant cannot be sentenced under two separate statutory provisions when the
statutory construction is ambiguous concerning the two statutes) (superseded by
statute, see U.S. v. Harris, 832 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1987)).
55. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (because § 1202(a)(1) of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is ambiguous as to whether
receipt or possession of firearm by a convicted felon has to be shown in an
individual prosecution to have been connected with interstate commerce, the statute
must be read narrowly).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 575-76 (1974) ("where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process." Smith, 415 U.S. at
576).
58. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (an interview in a private
attorney's office at which a sworn statement is given does not constitute a
"proceeding ancillary to a court or grand jury" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623 (Supp. 1 1976) which prohibits false declarations made under oath in any
"proceeding ancillary to a court or grand jury"). See also United States v.
Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (1988) (trial court erred in defining involuntary
servitude to the jury so that it would encompass psychological coercion).
59. 442 U.S. 100 (1979).
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convenient maxim of statutory construction," but rather was compelled by the constitutional requirement of due process. 6°
It follows that Congress cannot take away this constitutional

right or privilege by incorporating into RICO a provision that it is
to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. In
Counselman v. Hitchcock,61 the Supreme Court established as an
inviolate rule of law that "legislation cannot abridge a constitutional
privilege." That rule is applied as vigorously today as it was a
century ago. 62 "The establishment or reduction of constitutional
rights cannot be accomplished either by congressional action or

executive fiat. "63

There is a marked distinction between a penal statute on the
one hand, and a civil or remedial statute on the other.
The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary
sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong
to the public, or a wrong to the individual, according to the
familiar classification of Blackstone: 'Wrongs are divisible
into two sorts or species: private wrongs and public wrongs.
60. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979). At least one district
court has rejected an application of RICO's liberal construction provision as
contrary to the rule of lenity and therefore violative of the due process clause.
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976) (interpreting
"enterprise"). See also United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086, 1092 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1983) (defendant convicted for credit card fraud), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837
(1983).
61. 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) (the court found that a federal statute, which
provided that the evidence of a person shall not be used against him in any
proceeding for a crime or penalty, does not take away his privilege given by the
constitution).
62. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-59 (1972) (a federal
statute (18 U.S.C. § 6002) permitting the government to compel a witness to give
testimony, by granting immunity, does not violate the fifth amendment as long as
it does not abridge the Constitution); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 78-79 (1964) (a witness before an administrative agency does not waive his
privilege against self-incrimination by declining to assert it at the first hearing. The
Court found that a grant of immunity from prosecution is valid only if it is
coextensive with the scope of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).
63. Clark v. Board of Educ., 374 F.2d 569, 570 (8th Cir. 1967) (in this school
desegregation case, the Eighth Circuit stated that it does not abdicate to the
Department of Health Education and Welfare responsibility to determine proper
standards of constitutional protection, however, the Department's guidelines are
useful). See also United States v. Gallo, 859 F.2d 1078, 1090 (2d Cir. 1988) (Van
Graafeiland, J., concurring) (the Second Circuit was faced with the issue under
what circumstances a defendant will get a dismissal for fifth amendment rights
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 6002. The court found this error to be harmless).
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The former are an infringement or privation of the private
or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: the
latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties,
which affect the whole community, considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of
crimes and misdemeanors.'64
A penal statute is one that punishes. It is to be strictly construed

and is to be construed in favor of and not against the one who is
brought into court to answer to an alleged infraction. A remedial
enactment is one that seeks to give a remedy for an ill. It is to be
65
liberally construed so that its purpose may be realized.
It cannot be disputed seriously that 18 U.S.C. section 1962 is a
criminal statute, with criminal penalties as prescribed in 18 U.S.C.
section 1963. Congress cannot make it into anything else by referring

to its "remedial purposes." "If in reality a penalty it cannot be
converted into a tax by so naming it. . . ."66
Nor can the ambiguity of RICO in individual cases be alleviated

by a judicial declaration that RICO is not ambiguous but rather is
64. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1892) (quoting 3 BI. Com.
2) (emphasis in original) (this case dealt with a bill of equity by plaintiff to set
aside a transfer of stock on charge of fraud. Plaintiff received a New York
judgment on a penal action as determined by state court. Because it was penal in
nature the judgment may not be enforced by another state court, in this case
Maryland).
65. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 267
(E.D. Wash. 1940) (this was a suit by the SEC against defendant to enjoin the use
of any means of interstate transportation to sell securities. The court held that the
Security Act is remedial and must be liberally construed). See also Schaefer v. H.B.
Green Transp. Line, Inc., 232 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1956) (the court held that a
writ of mandamus, forcing an Iowa corporation to open its record to plaintiff, was
penal in nature and not enforceable in federal court in Illinois); Bowles v. Farmers
National Bank, 147 F.2d 425, 427-30 (6th Cir. 1945) (the court held that in a suit
under § 205(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 the award of treble
damages, because it is a penalty, does not survive death of one charged).
66. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935) (in this case, the
court held that an Act of Congress, which imposed a so-called $1000 excise tax on
persons who conducted retail liquor business contrary to state law, was unenforceable since the Act imposed a penalty as distinguished from a tax. This imposition
is a violation of a state's police powers since the repeal of the eighteenth amendment). See also trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958) (the court found that §
401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 was invalid since § 401(g) was penal in nature.
The question of whether a statute is penal in nature depends upon the purpose of
the statute, the severity of the disability imposed and all the circumstances surrounding the legislative enactment).
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simply broad. 67 On the contrary, it is the indeterminacy between a
broad and a narrow interpretation of RICO which describes the
ambiguity of the statute.
III.

CONCLUSION

If, as I have attempted to show, RICO has been and continues
to be rife with ambiguity, Congress' direction that the statute is to
be liberally construed is patently unconstitutional. This is simply an
innocuous way of saying that the statute should be construed in
favor of the government. Time and again the courts have done
exactly that. 61 If a criminal statute satisfies the due process require-

67. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
68. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union
639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418
(7th Cir.) (the court held that ambiguities as to the receipt of illegal gratuities in
violation of Illinois official misconduct statute could constitute predicate RICO
violations. Thus, RICO should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose), cert. denied, 108 S, Ct. 2022 (1988); United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d
1235, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1987) (the court discussed the Congressional emphasis on
new remedial actions for organized crime, and noted that Congress intended to
have RICO liberally construed); United States v. Callanan, 810 F.2d 544, 546 (6th
Cir.) (in upholding concurrent sentences of the conspiracy and substantive offense
charges under RICO, the court held that a liberal construction of the RICO Act
indicated that Congress intended that the conspiracy and substantive violations of
RICO were to be separate offenses that do not merge for sentencing purposes),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 107 (1987); United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802
(7th Cir. 1985) (the court applied a broad interpretation of the RICO forfeiture
provision of § 1963(a)(1) and rejected the defendant's interpretation which would
have required the government to trace the proceeds of racketeering activity in order
to prove that they are still in existence at time of conviction); United States v.
Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1984) (court liberally construed forfeiture
provision of § 1963(a)(1) of RICO stating that any property used in violation of
RICO provisions are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1458 (lth
Cir. 1984) (the court acknowledged Congress' express mandate that RICO be
construed liberally and therefore found that there was an "enterprise" and therefore
the property was properly forfeited), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); United
States v. Ruggiereo, 726 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir.) (the court noted that, guided by
Congress' intention to liberally construe RICO, a conspiracy to murder is an "act
involving" murder and falls under RICO statute), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984);
United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 54 (2d Cir.) (the court found that when the
remedial purposes of RICO are implicated, no element of proof need be shown
because of RICO's liberal construction), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United
States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Altese,
542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977))
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ment of adequate warning, there is no need to follow the congressional command of liberal construction. If the statute does not

satisfy the due process requirement, the congressional command of
liberal construction should be rejected as a legislative attempt to
deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights.
Although the doctrine of lenity ordinarily is not applied in civil
cases, a reasonable argument might be made that the treble damage
provisions are sufficiently drastic in nature to warrant strict interpretation of ambiguous terms. 69 Assuming that this argument lacks
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 997
(6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1981) (in
enacting RICO, the court held that Congress intended to permit cumulative sentences for substantive RICO offenses and underlying predicate offenses. This
conclusion was reached by liberal construction of the RICO Act); United States v.
Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979) (in interpreting the word "enterprise" the
court stated ". . . courts have consistently construed 'enterprise' broadly in light
of Congress' mandate that ... Title IX of the Act 'shall be liberally construed"),

cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Salinas, 564 F.2d 688, 691 n.7
(5th Cir. 1977) (court emphasized that RICO Act should be liberally construed and
therefore rejected defendant's argument which tried to avoid state statute criminalizing gambling because state statute not as specific as federal statute), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974) (the court
found that activities of a foreign corporation had requisite effect on interstate
commerce for purposes of falling under the RICO Act. This determination was
made under the influence of Congress' mandate to liberally construe the RICO Act
in order to effectuate its remedial purposes), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
69. Summers v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
(the FDIC moved to strike the plaintiff's claim for treble damages under the RICO
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982), since the statute was essentially penal in nature
and such damages cannot be assessed against the FDIC. The district court found
that the treble damages under § 1964(c) cannot be characterized definitely as penal
or remedial but instead must be analyzed seriatim. In this case, the treble damages
section was considered penal). See Image and Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv.
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956) The district court was confronted
with an action under the Clayton Act to recover treble damages for alleged
violations of the Sherman Act. In finding that the plaintiff was not engaged in
"business" within the meaning of the Clayton Act and thus not entitled to recover,
the court found that the treble damage provision of the Clayton Act, which allows
a person to recover three-fold the damages he has sustained, was a drastic remedy
and thus, should be strictly construed); Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. N.J. 1941) (this court agreed with the
court in Image & Sound Serv. Corp. in that the antitrust treble damage sections
are harsh and should therefore be subject to strict interpretation). But see Herald
Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125, 128-31 (8th Cir. 1969) (even if the Clayton Act treble
damages provision were punitive in nature, the court held that this characterization
would not be enough to afford it the safeguards of a criminal proceeding).
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merit, it does not follow that the antithetical process of construing
the statute liberally in favor of the plaintiff should be adopted in
civil cases. The Supreme Court's "broad[]" and "liberal[]" reading
of RICO in Sedima, 70 a civil action, led to a decision that is accepted
as binding precedent, not only in civil cases, but in criminal cases
as well. 7' In view of the "extraordinary" applications of civil RICO, 72
the employment of a liberal construction rule in civil cases should
be avoided to discourage continued unwanted expansion, both civilly
73
and criminally.
Justice Jackson's comments in Krulewitch v. United States, 74
relative to the interplay of civil and criminal conspiracy are equally
applicable to civil and criminal RICO:
The interchangeable use of conspiracy doctrine in civil as
well as penal proceedings opens it to the danger, absent in
the case of many crimes, that a court having in mind only
the civil sanctions will approve lax practices which later are
imported into criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings this
Court frankly has made the end a test of the means, saying,
"[tlo require a greater showing would cripple the Act," in
dispensing with the necessity for specific intent tO produce a
result violative of the statute. Further, the Court has dispensed with even the necessity to infer any definite agreement,
although that is the gist of the offense. "It is elementary that
an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed Without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. . . ." One might go on from the reports of this and
lower courts and put together their decisions condoning absence of proof to demonstrate that the minimum of proof
required to establish conspiracy is extremely low, and we
may expect our pronouncements in civil cases to be followed
75
in criminal ones also.
70. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1986)
(applying Sedima in criminal RICO mail fraud case). It is noteworthy that the
Second Circuit's en banc review of Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d i03 (2d Cir.
1988), vacated en banc, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1989), a civil case, was conducted
simultaneously with that Court's en banc consideration of United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989), a criminal case.
72. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
73. Id. at 530 (Powell, J., dissenting).
74. 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (Jackson, J. concurring) (construing "conspiracy"
statute which attempted to affect organized crime).
75. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1949) (citations omit-
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Because RICO is one of the most controversial statutes that has
emanated from Congress in many years, it may, like the Volstead
Act, 76 have a limited life span. However, once the judiciary affirms
the power of Congress to declare that ambiguous criminal enactments
shall be construed liberally, that power will survive although RICO
is gone. If that happens, a long-standing tradition of fairness and
justice will have disappeared from the American scene. Recognition
of the undeniable fact that RICO is ambiguous and application of
the doctrine of lenity would, it is hoped, preclude this from occurring.

76. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by Liquor
Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).

